Money or Credit? MiCA's Stablecoin Hybrid and the Direction of the 2026 Review

1. The consultation as evidence

A regulation does more than lay down rules. It sorts the world into categories — legal classes such as “deposit”, “security” or “electronic money” — and assigns each its own rulebook. A category is not a neutral label. Once it is written into law, it quietly settles which risks supervisors are told to look for and which they are not; it becomes the lens through which the instrument is seen. That is the sense in which this note uses the word throughout: not a description of what a thing is, but a decision, embedded in law, about how it will be watched.

Most of the time the decision is invisible, because the category presents itself as plain fact. A public consultation is the rare moment when the rulebook is reopened and the decision is back on the table in plain view. The European Commission’s targeted consultation on the review of the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA), published on 20 May 2026 and open until 31 August 2026, is such a moment — a primary document about what European law takes a stablecoin to be, and where it is minded to take it next. This note reads the consultation as a dated specimen rather than as proof; the weight of the argument rests on the structure of the regulation, to which the consultation is a timely witness.

The familiar shorthand is that MiCA treats fiat-backed stablecoins as electronic money — a digital wrapper around money that already exists, regulated to keep the wrapper honest. That shorthand is wrong, and getting it wrong hides the real question. MiCA did not drop stablecoins into the light-touch e-money box and leave them there. It built a hybrid. The 2026 review is a contest over which way that hybrid should now move. Four claims organise what follows: that MiCA’s non-bank regime is mis-shaped rather than lax; that the choice of issuer — bank or non-bank — is where coherence is won or lost; that three EU institutions are pulling the hybrid toward three different destinations; and that the consultation is a dated specimen in which all three pulls are visible at once.

2. The status quo is already a hybrid — and the issuer is the fork

Begin with what the regulation actually requires. An “e-money token” (EMT) is deemed to be electronic money under Article 48(2), and may be issued only by a bank (a credit institution) or by an authorised electronic money institution (EMI). So far, this is ordinary e-money. But MiCA then bolts onto that base a set of requirements drawn from banking law — and the bolts tighten sharply for the issuers that matter.

A smaller, “non-significant” issuer already carries more than the e-money tradition asks. It must hold own funds (loss-absorbing capital) of at least 2% of the reserve assets backing the tokens, and safeguard the money it takes in. Under MiCA’s technical standards (the EBA draft RTS under Articles 36 and 38), at least 30% of the backing must sit as deposits in banks, and the rest in high-quality liquid assets — claims on central banks, government bonds, the safest covered bonds. On top of that come a ban on paying interest, limits on what the reserve may be invested in, a prospectus-like disclosure document carrying legal liability, and — revealingly — recovery and redemption plans, the contingency paperwork of bank resolution. For an issuer judged “significant”, the regime crosses fully into banking territory. Its capital must be of the highest quality — Common Equity Tier 1, the standard set for banks in the Capital Requirements Regulation — and supervisors can demand 20–40% more after stress tests (Article 45(5)), subject to a floor of 3% of the reserve (Article 45(4)). The bank-deposit minimum rises to 60% under the technical standards, custody and investment rules harden, and supervision is shared between the national authority and the European Banking Authority, with binding-opinion powers reserved for the European Central Bank. A national supervisor may even move a non-significant issuer toward the stricter regime the moment liquidity, operational or solvency risk appears (Article 58(2)).

A decisive fork sits inside this regime, and the argument must be precise about it. When a bank issues an EMT, the token is the liability of an institution already inside the public safety net — the standing public guarantees that keep a bank’s promises credible: deposit insurance, a resolution regime for winding down a failing institution in an orderly way, and a central bank ready to lend against good collateral in a crisis (the lender of last resort). Such a bank is supervised under the full banking rulebook and can reach central-bank liquidity. That corner, in the terms set out below, is broadly coherent: runnable private money sits where runnable private money belongs, behind a backstop. (One wrinkle survives even here — e-money is excluded from deposit-insurance cover, so the token-holder’s claim is not protected the way a depositor’s is, and central-bank lending rescues the institution rather than the peg. But the issuer is inside the perimeter.) The trouble lives in the other branch of the fork: the non-bank EMI, which carries the same bank-grade prudence just described while standing entirely outside the safety net — no deposit insurance, no resolution regime, no committed lender of last resort.

What that branch amounts to is narrow-bank prudence without the safety net. The issuer holds safe, liquid reserves one-for-one against the tokens, keeps bank-quality capital, runs stress tests and writes crisis plans — all the front-loaded caution of a heavily regulated institution — but enjoys none of the public guarantees that let a bank keep its word in a panic. The problem, then, is not too little regulation. It is mis-shaped regulation: banking-grade prudence bolted to a chassis that lacks the one part — a backstop — that would make the prudence add up. A substantial literature rightly calls MiCA a rigorous, even benchmark, framework; the quarrel here is not that it is lax but that, for the non-bank branch, its rigour is aimed at the wrong target. And, as we will see, the market is already drifting away from this branch toward bank issuance.

3. The escalation ladder

The strain shows on the face of the consultation. Read Part 2 — the stablecoin part — straight through, in order, and the vocabulary climbs (Figure 1). It opens in the language of payments: stablecoins as a “means of payment”, use cases from remittances to retail settlement (Q9–Q10). Then the ground shifts — to capital adequacy (Q11–Q13), to the makeup of the reserve and its behaviour under stress (Q14–Q16), to the thresholds that make an issuer “significant” (Q17–Q19), to redemption rights tested in “normal” versus “stressed” markets (Q20–Q23). Near the top, the e-money frame falls away entirely: the consultation asks whether issuers should hold reserves in central-bank accounts, whether there should be a dedicated resolution regime, and whether they should reach lender-of-last-resort support (Q24–Q26). It ends on multi-issuance, cross-border reserve flight under stress, and the international role of the euro (Q27–Q41).

On its own this proves little: a review of a prudential regime will naturally ask prudential questions, and a consultation exists to canvass opposing options. The ladder is offered not as proof but as the visible surface of a tension the rest of the note sets out from the structure. Two features still repay attention. First, the climb runs in one direction — toward the lender of last resort — an odd destination for a questionnaire about a payment instrument. Second, the top of the ladder sets out two exits that point opposite ways: a lender-of-last-resort facility (Q25) would pull the instrument toward full banking, while holding reserves at the central bank (Q25, again) would pull it the other way, toward narrow money. A document that lists both is not deciding. It is recording a choice that has not yet been made.

4. The unasked question and the trilemma

For all its eighty-six questions, the consultation never poses — as such — the one on which the rest depend: is an e-money token ultimately a claim on the state (narrow money, the close cousin of a central-bank digital currency held through an intermediary) or a private debt that merely promises to be worth a euro? The possible answers appear only as scattered options on the menu — central-bank accounts, lender-of-last-resort access, a resolution regime, each offered for a 1-to-5 appropriateness rating (Q24–Q26) — never as the prior choice that would organise them. Yet every dial the consultation does turn (capital, reserve composition, segregation, backstop, redemption) is set by that unposed choice.

One reply must be met at once. It is tempting to say the EU has already answered: an EMT is potentially-systemic private money, regulated on a sliding scale. But a sliding scale of how hard to regulate is not an answer to what the thing is, or who stands behind its promise to be worth a euro. The “significance” regime turns the prudential volume up at the top end while leaving the underlying design — private debt, a fixed promise, no backstop — unchanged at every setting. The volume knob turns; the machine does not change.

The structure resolves into a trilemma (Figure 2). The claim is not an impossibility theorem but a trade-off: three goals can be held cleanly only two at a time, and reaching for the third comes at the expense of one of the others. MiCA’s non-bank regime reaches for all three at once. The first is par stability — the promise to redeem at par, that is, to hand back one euro for one token, on demand, always. The second is private credit creation — holding the backing in assets that are not central-bank money (bank deposits, bonds), so the issuer carries credit and liquidity risk and earns the spread; this risk-taking is the essence of banking. The third is no public backstop — no taxpayer on the hook, which is a genuine political goal, not a mere omission. Any two of these sit together comfortably; the third then leaks.

Take them in turn. Par stability with no backstop is achievable — but only by giving up credit creation: the reserve is held as central-bank money, fully safe and liquid. This is narrow money — a claim backed one-for-one by the central bank, with nothing lent out or put at risk. There is nothing to run on, and — this is the answer to the charge that the argument contradicts itself — it needs no lender of last resort precisely because it does no maturity transformation, no borrowing-short-to-hold-longer (Goel, 2024; Adrian & Mancini-Griffoli, 2019). Credit creation with no backstop is achievable — but only by giving up reliable par: the value floats and breaks under stress. This is free banking, whose emblem is the nineteenth-century banknote that traded at a discount the further it travelled from its issuer (Gorton & Zhang, 2023). Par stability with credit creation is the settlement we live with for ordinary bank deposits — and it is bought with a large, explicit backstop: deposit insurance, resolution, and the lender of last resort. Read the other way, this is simply the old choice between narrow money and backstopped banking; MiCA’s non-bank corner sits in neither.

Three apparent escapes look like a fourth, comfortable option; none is. A floating value — the post-crisis money-market-fund design — does not refute the trade-off but accepts it, by giving up par: drop the promise of one-for-one redemption and you are back on the credit-creation-without-backstop edge, with a price that floats in stress. Backing the token entirely in short-dated government paper looks safer, and is — against credit risk. It does nothing about liquidity risk: a Treasury bill is not worth its full value on demand when everyone sells at once, as the March 2020 “dash for cash” showed, when even US Treasuries gapped until the central bank stepped in. A par promise at scale therefore leans on a liquidity backstop; a standing facility that lends against high-quality assets (a central-bank repo line) can supply one — but that is a public backstop at one remove, not its absence, which is exactly the point. High-quality reserves shrink the credit problem and leave the coordination problem for the backstop to catch. Private insurance or over-collateralisation, finally, cannot stand in at the scale of a systemic settlement asset — private guarantees are precisely what fail when the whole system turns down at once (Awrey, 2020). One escape is real, but unflattering. There is no such thing as “no backstop” once an issuer is systemic, because the authorities will improvise rescue in a crisis — as the US did for the stablecoin USDC by guaranteeing the uninsured depositors of Silicon Valley Bank. That is the point, not a refutation: an implicit, uncommitted, unpriced backstop is the worst kind, leaving the public to absorb a risk it never supervised or charged for. “No backstop” turns out to mean “no acknowledged backstop”. The trade-off holds.

A deeper objection remains, and meeting it sharpens the claim. Non-bank institutions have promised stable value without a lender of last resort for decades — money-market funds, payment firms, e-money issuers. Why is MiCA’s hybrid incoherent rather than just another example of that tolerated arrangement? Because the arrangement was tolerated on terms MiCA’s ambitions for stablecoins do not meet. Money-market funds that promised a fixed value repeatedly needed emergency public rescue when stress came — central-bank facilities in 2008 and again in 2020 — after which regulators pushed many toward floating values or redemption gates; the fixed-value-without-backstop promise did not survive contact with a run (a rush by holders to redeem first, each rationally fearing the others will get out ahead of them), which is evidence for the trade-off, not against it (Anadu et al., 2023). Traditional e-money, meanwhile, was tolerated because it stayed small, was not an investment, and posed no system-wide risk — a float for prepaid cards, not the settlement layer of tokenised markets. MiCA’s regime wants the opposite on every count: scale, a hard par promise, a role as core settlement infrastructure, and no backstop. The “significance” regime is the regulation’s own admission that scale changes the problem; it raises the prudential intensity but leaves the structure intact. A peer-reviewed reading reaches an adjacent verdict from another angle: Martino (2022) finds that MiCA’s design can itself create incentives to run when liquidity dries up, and urges alignment with money-market-fund rules — independent support, though his trade-off runs between innovation, investor protection and stability, where the one here runs between par, private credit and backstop.

The exhibit makes the mechanism concrete. MiCA requires at least 30% of the reserve (60% for significant tokens) to sit in commercial-bank deposits — the liquid, redeemable-on-demand leg of the reserve in calm conditions, but, above the insured threshold, uninsured private credit, and the very exposure that broke USDC under stress — all under an unconditional par promise with no backstop. The March 2023 USDC episode shows the channel: a US, non-MiCA token held part of its reserve at Silicon Valley Bank; when the bank failed and the exposure came to light, the token fell to about $0.87, the trouble spreading to other coins that held USDC as collateral, and par was restored only once the US authorities guaranteed SVB’s uninsured depositors (Ahmed, Aldasoro & Duley, 2025; Anadu et al., 2023). It is an illustration, not an indictment of MiCA’s text — and MiCA’s diversification and deposit rules would soften that particular concentration. The honest qualification is that fiat-backed coins have proved far more resilient than the algorithmic designs that actually collapsed; what is decisive is the credit risk carried by the reserve, and the run literature finds that even the most closely scrutinised fiat coin keeps real run risk through concentrated bank-deposit holdings (Ma, Zeng & Zhang, 2025). That is what makes MiCA’s 30–60% commercial-bank-deposit requirement — uninsured private credit — the specific design flaw, rather than stablecoins as such. The MiCA-specific point is then the ECB’s own: the deposit requirement can act as a liquidity cushion in calm and turn into a channel that carries a stablecoin run into the banking system under stress (ECB, 2026b). The reserve rule routes banking risk through the token while the category insists no banking is going on. The configuration is an on-chain replay of an old one — wildcat banking, and the offshore eurodollar market, where dollar promises multiplied beyond the reach of the issuing authority’s reserves; the “money view” maps on-chain onto offshore almost exactly (Aldasoro, Mehrling & Neilson, 2023).

5. The direction of travel: three institutions, three destinations

If the non-bank corner is incoherent, the live question — and what the consultation is really about — is the direction of travel. Is the EU pushing the hybrid toward credit (the bank corner), back toward payments (the e-money corner), or somewhere new? On the 2025–26 record there is no single direction. Three institutions pull three ways, and the consultation is where their pulls overlap. Such inter-institutional bargaining is, of course, ordinary; the narrower claim here is that it is going on without the constitutive question being posed, so its product will be a calibrated middle rather than a coherent design.

The consultation’s framing leans toward the payment-rail corner, under competitiveness pressure. It speaks openly of a “simplification agenda” and “EU competitiveness”, against the backdrop of the 2025 US GENIUS Act, which its own sponsors describe as a tool to cement the dollar’s dominance and demand for US debt. With roughly 98% of stablecoins denominated in dollars, the fear of “digital dollarisation” pulls toward keeping a viable, lightly burdened euro-EMT class alive. (The Commission is not a single mind — its financial-services arm carries a stability mandate too — which is part of why the document pulls in more than one direction.)

The ECB pulls two ways, but its destination is neither corner of the private trilemma. On systemic risk it is firmly restrictive: with the European Systemic Risk Board it has pressed to restrict the “multi-issuance” model, in which the same token is issued jointly inside and outside the EU, so that in a run holders rush to redeem wherever protection is strongest and drain the EU reserve — a line first set out in Recommendation ESRB/2023/8 and renewed during the 2026 review (ESRB, 2023; ECB, 2026a). But its deeper move is to deny that a private token should carry the monetary function at all. In a May 2026 address, Cipollone argued for “separating functions from instruments”: a private token may do the settlement job so long as it is anchored to central-bank money, but the monetary job should rest on public money — the digital euro (Cipollone, 2026). This is not the same as “make the token a synthetic central-bank currency” (Path A below): Path A keeps the money-ness in the private token and makes it safe; the ECB’s move takes the money-ness out of the private token and lodges it in the digital euro, leaving the token as tethered plumbing. The credit-versus-e-money axis misses it.

The EBA defends the status quo. In November 2025 it pushed back on the multi-issuance ban, judging MiCA’s existing tools adequate (EBA, 2025).

And the market is quietly choosing. Euro-denominated stablecoins are still tiny — about €450 million in January 2026 against roughly $300 billion in dollar tokens — but one large EU bank already issues one and a consortium of about a dozen more is forming to launch a shared euro stablecoin (ECB, 2026b). The revealed preference is to pull runnable money back inside the banking system — bank-issued stablecoins and tokenised deposits — rather than perfect the free-standing EMI hybrid. That is at least consistent with the diagnosis, and is plausibly explained by it: issuers are migrating to the one corner that already has a backstop. (The note’s falsifiable claim rests on the failure mode named in the coda, not on market share.)

So the consultation’s apparent “drift toward banking” is not the Commission deciding to turn stablecoins into banks. It is the ECB’s vocabulary — resolution, lender of last resort, central-bank accounts — surfacing inside the Commission’s document, the trace of an unresolved contest. The two private-money exits both sit in the text: central-bank reserve access (Path A, narrow money — also Bruegel’s proposal to let issuers onto the ECB balance sheet; Bruegel, 2026) and full banking treatment with a backstop (Path B). On current evidence, neither will be chosen cleanly. The likely 2026 outcome is a recalibrated hybrid — credit-ward at the systemic top, e-money-ward at the competitive base — the trilemma left intact and the interior of the triangle merely redecorated, while the market exits stage left into bank issuance.

6. Doctrinal or motivated?

Why is the organising question never put? Partly because the inherited e-money category shapes perception so completely that the prior question simply does not present itself — a doctrinal blind spot. Partly because the competitiveness agenda makes naming stablecoins as banking inconvenient — a motivated one. And partly because three institutions hold three implicit answers, and a consultation gathers views rather than settling between them: the document cannot pose the constitutive question, because to pose it would force a choice the EU’s architecture cannot presently make. For the diagnosis this is enough — whichever reason dominates, the regime it produces leaves the non-bank corner in the unstable interior of the trilemma. The claim is not that anyone is blind. It is that the inherited category, and the unresolved contest behind it, keep the foundational choice off the table — and a review is exactly the occasion to put it back.

7. The remaining objection

One objection deserves a direct answer, because the note concedes its premise. “MiCA already treats significant stablecoins as quasi-banking, so the dichotomy is a strawman.” Just so — and that is the problem. MiCA imposes bank-grade prudence on the non-bank issuer while withholding the backstop that makes a bank’s promise credible. Tiering bank-like duties onto a chassis with no backstop is not a proportionate banking regime; it is a conflicted one. The toughness is real but mis-shaped: front-loaded caution where the par promise actually needs a backstop that can stop a panic in its tracks. Capital absorbs losses; it does not stop a run, because a run is a problem of coordination, not of solvency. Nor do the recovery and redemption plans MiCA requires: these are issuer-level contingency documents, not a system-wide backstop, and they bind too late — once a run is under way, an orderly wind-down is precisely what holders are racing to get ahead of.

8. What the review is for

The conclusion follows from the trade-off, not from any contested theory of money. For the non-bank corner, the EU should choose an edge of the triangle and build it.

Make the veil true (Path A). Hold the reserve in fully safe, liquid public claims — ideally central-bank accounts — inside a structure ring-fenced from the issuer’s bankruptcy. The token becomes narrow money: nothing to run on, no backstop required, the interest ban harmless. This is where the ECB’s instincts and Bruegel’s central-bank-access proposal converge (Cipollone, 2026; Bruegel, 2026).

Acknowledge the construct (Path B). Regulate the issuer of a par-promising private debt as the monetary institution it is — banking authorisation, a real resolution regime, backstop access matched to supervision (Gorton & Zhang, 2023; Awrey, 2022). In effect, route the instrument to the bank corner it already half-occupies — which is where the market is heading on its own.

Carry the monetary function in public money (Path C). Let the digital euro and central-bank-money settlement carry the money-ness, and admit private tokens only as tethered settlement instruments. This dissolves the trade-off by taking private issuance out of the monetary job rather than by fixing its terms.

Each path is coherent, and each carries a price the note does not hide: narrow money gives up private credit creation, and some hold that narrow banking is not welfare-improving (Williamson, 2024), while a freer hand for private issuers shades toward the very free-banking corner this note warns against (Petratos et al., 2025). What is not coherent is the corner the EU’s non-bank regime occupies now, and seems likely merely to redecorate: private issuance, a slice of uninsured bank-credit exposure, a hard par promise, and no backstop — bank-grade prudence standing in for a safety net it cannot replace. Multi-issuance is the same trade-off in cross-border form: a single fungible token makes the par promise global while the reserve that backs it stays national, so either multi-issuance is disallowed or reserve adequacy is consolidated globally with binding cooperation. Restricting redemption to EU holders — floated in the consultation as a safeguard — is the worst answer, because it breaks the singleness of money within the token itself: the same coin would be worth more in one place than another.

The 2026 review presents itself as calibration — better thresholds, simpler rules, sharper standards. The argument here is that calibration is the wrong task. Before the dials can be set, the EU has to decide which machine it is building; and, on present evidence, three of its institutions want three different machines while the market quietly builds a fourth. The eighty-six questions are, between the lines, one unanswered one: money, or credit, or neither-but-anchored? Europe should answer it on purpose, rather than let an inherited category and an unresolved contest answer it by default.

This note draws on a longer programme on how codified monetary doctrine shapes the distribution of supervisory attention (Pedersen, “What the Rule-Book Cannot See”, MPRA No. 129388, 2026). It stops short of prediction in the sense that matters: it forecasts no crisis on a date. The structural claim does carry one concrete, falsifiable expectation — that should a failure come, it will come as a liquidity-driven break in the peg of a non-bank-issued significant EMT under stress, absent official intervention, rather than as a slow erosion of solvency. The expectation is two-sided: a sustained stretch of years in which significant non-bank EMTs reach scale and weather market stress like high-quality payment rails — no liquidity-driven break, no improvised public rescue — would count against the reading offered here. And should the review instead resolve the structure — central-bank-held reserves, banking-style treatment, or a public anchor — that too would remove the expectation, and be a clean, dated test.

Disclosure: the author is the founder of Eurodollar, a regulated stablecoin issuer based in Denmark, and therefore has a direct commercial interest in the regulation discussed here. This note is offered as analysis rather than advocacy for any single design; readers should weigh the author’s interest accordingly.

References

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